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pAbstract
Microfinance is the provision of financial services to the financially excluded, usually
the poor. We use literature reviews and descriptive research to present different
aspects of the relationship of the microfinancial services to microenterprise. The first
thrust in this field had been from microcredit and group lending to encourage
business initiatives among the poor. The hope that these services would lift them
out of poverty had largely built the brand image of the sector. However, the
spread of consumer microcredit and uncontrolled growth of microfinance led to
over-lending without adequate checks and balances, leading to over-indebtedness
and associated stress, and critique of microcredit. To restore balance, other financial
products, such as microequity, microsavings, microinsurance, microguarantees, and
microremittances, have been suggested. We place these developments in a social
innovation process perspective by showing that microfinance, through its wide
range of innovatively distributed products, can be a key factor to foster
entrepreneurship.
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Background
Addressing poverty is a complex issue. Different researchers and professionals have fo-
cused on different tools. For example, De Soto (2000) stresses that the absence of
property rights keeps countries from developing, Prahalad (2006) feels that the least of
the poor should be targeted as consumers and included into the market, Karnani
(2007) feels that there is no fortune at the bottom of the pyramid and the poor need
public sector jobs, and Ashta (2013b) feels the need for raising minimum wages for
those who already have jobs. Sachs (2005) feels that the very poor are so incapacitated
that only donations would help, and Yunus (2003) recommends microcredit. There are
many other issues involved such as health and education. All these researchers and
practitioners realize that the tool they are focusing on is just one in a bag of tools re-
quired to increase the capital of the poor: Since the governments of these countries are
poor and cannot provide the basic services such as property rights, adequate public
works, or even high-enough minimum wages, one possible solution advocated is self-
help: for the poor to rise from poverty requires them to become microentrepreneurs
and take charge of their own fate. The free market has not solved the problem because
entrepreneurship requires financial capital, social capital, and human capital.Ashta et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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tions cannot solve the problem. Schumpeter (1935) considers innovation as the produc-
tion of a new good, the introduction of a new method of production, the opening of a
new market, the conquest of a new source of raw material, and the creation of a new
organization. Social innovation means that new forms of social relations are required in
order to overcome the financial and social exclusion and create empowerment
(Moulaert et al. 2013b). Evidently, this requires overcoming conservative forces which
would prefer to perpetuate the existing system or try to take over any new system to its
own advantage and, thus, either perpetuate the exclusion or find new ways to exploit
(Moulaert et al. 2013a). This agency paradox needs to be overcome by institutional en-
trepreneurs, aiming at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions (Lawrence
et al. 2009). They do this by influencing public policy and legislation.
Microcredit is one example of a social innovation because it is an initiative taken by
actors in order to provide new answers to social problems (social and financial exclu-
sion, poverty) and a device capable of providing services to enable construction of a so-
ciety with high levels of quality of life. Hence, it is also a social innovation (Assogba
2007; Couchoro 2001) in the sense of focus on being a response to social needs
(Cloutier 2003). It may also impact the environment because it is focused on a local de-
velopment. It has developed new social relations in different ways (Ashta et al. 2013)
that have included getting conservative local actors to work towards inclusion (Marti
and Mair 2009). However, there are a multitude of conservative actors who are
nonlocal and would like to use the microcredit movement to suit their own ends in-
stead of developing entrepreneurship. We therefore need to provide other solutions to
mitigate the misuse of microcredit. One such solution is to provide other financial
products and go from microcredit to microfinance. In this paper, we focus on
microfinance and whether the new financial products can develop entrepreneurship.
Microfinance is the provision of financial services to the poor and the financially ex-
cluded. These financial services include credit, savings, insurance, remittances, and
guarantees, among others. As a result, an associated vocabulary includes microcredit,
microsavings, microinsurance, microremittances, and microguarantees. A relatively
new focus has been on providing microequity.
The major common problem of providing all these services to the poor is that the
transaction size is very small. As a result, any processing cost, or transaction cost, be-
comes a high percentage of the transaction amount. This makes the product very
expensive for commercial banks and formal financial institutions to provide these ser-
vices to the poor, who therefore remain excluded. A second common problem is that
the poor not only lack financial capital but are also often socially excluded and lack
bridges to rich people. A third common problem is that they are often uneducated,
even illiterate, and excluded from technological innovations.
To solve these problems, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have created social innova-
tions which permit them to offer financial products which were otherwise not viable
commercially (Armendàriz and Morduch 2010). Seeing the success of MFIs, hitherto
conservative commercial financial institutions are also downscaling to profit from the
vast market at the bottom of the pyramid. All of these are trying to use advanced tech-
nologies such as management information systems, mobile banking, and online finan-
cing to increase their outreach (Ashta et al. 2011). The question is whether their own
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to turn the system to their advantage.
Research methodology
Our research methodology is to use literature reviews and descriptive research based
on empirical data from secondary sources. Such research is a good starting point to
take inventory as well as to find patterns based on which future analytical research can
find explanations.
Descriptive research on industry dynamics has identified a dominant pattern where
prices fall, output rises, and the number of firms rises and then falls over time.
Several models have been advanced to explain these patterns (Lenox et al. 2007).The descriptive research on compliance costs emphasizes the burden of compliance
costs, with little attention to measuring any benefits from tax planning. In contrast,
the analytical research in tax evasion suggests an incremental benefit of compliance
costs in reducing taxes (Mills 1996).
In fact, there is a growing field which considers that too many papers unnecessarily
develop theoretical models rather than simply presenting their findings (Leung 2011;
Hambrick 2007).
Results and discussion
We will start with the relationship of entrepreneurship to microcredit because it is the
most developed product in microfinance. But today, it is being increasingly realized
that other complimentary financial products are necessary for the poor, and the rela-
tionship of these to entrepreneurship will be discussed in the next part.
Microcredit and entrepreneurship
What is microcredit?
In underdeveloped countries, the vast majority of the population has no access to the
banking system, whether in rural or in urban areas. The absence of appropriate formal
financial services had long led the people to the informal financial sector. At best, they
use Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), a traditional practice of mo-
bilizing savings, brilliant but sometimes very risky (and reserved for the middle class,
the one having the capacity to save) and at worst they are entrenched with the usurious
moneylender, with very prohibitive interest rates, for example, 300% in Ethiopia (Belwal
et al. 2012). In the 1990s, it was estimated that 90% of adult African population was ex-
cluded from financial services compared to 85% for Brazil (Gentil and Servet 2002).
Data available from Microcredit Summit shows that by 2010, 11% of the poor in Africa
and Middle East, 32% in Latin America, and 69% in Asia and the Pacific were being
covered by microcredit (Maes and Reed 2012). To the extent that a dent has been made
in the exclusion problem, we can say that in this respect (outcome), microcredit is a so-
cial innovation.
To understand the other aspects of this social innovation, it is important to under-
stand the problems it addressed. Essentially, lending to the poor suffered from three
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(Armendàriz and Morduch 2005; Ashta 2009; Wydick 2002). The first, default risk,
arose from asymmetric information as well as a lack of physical collateral with the poor
borrowers. The asymmetric problem arose from the lack of information on the
borrower's ability and willingness to repay the loans and thus an inability to separate
safe borrowers from risky types. The lack of enforcement capacity owing to voids in
legal enforcement systems created other threats for reinforcing moral hazard. The sec-
ond, high transaction costs, arose from the small, or micro, size of the loan being at-
tributed. Any fixed cost of processing the loan application as well as servicing the loan
to take back reimbursement becomes high in relation to the small amount of the loan.
Finally, even if the poor could be provided financial capital, it was felt that they would
not be able to be entrepreneurial since they did not have the necessary complimentary
social and human capital. This reinforced the moral hazard. For richer borrowers,
banks solve the risk problem by asking for collateral, but the poor do not have either
collateral or the legal documents for the property they may have acquired (Belwal et al.
2012; De Soto 2000).
Microcredit aims towards a minimal equality in the access to credit by allowing
people excluded from the traditional financial system to take loans for creating their
own jobs. It can be defined as any loan initiative intended to create income-generating
activities, focused on microentrepreneurs with no access to traditional bank lending. It
aims to fight against poverty. The Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) 2010 sta-
tistics show that gross loans portfolio and the average loan are different from one re-
gion to another (Table 1).
Owing to low transaction sizes and because of the relatively high processing costs,
MFIs apply an interest rate generally higher than that of the banking sector. Regulators
do try in some countries to control this, but the ceiling varies over time. For example,
in the particular case of countries of the West African Monetary Zone (Couchoro
2011), laws on usury for all financial institutions operating in the area impose ‘an usury
ceiling’ not exceeding twice the discount rate of the central bank (i.e., 17% per year).
The MFIs have since obtained a waiver; the central bank has revised the law on usury.
Today there are two ceilings: one for commercial banks (18%) and the other for MFIs
(27%). Therefore, we can see that microcredit has been able to influence public policy
to enhance its institutional work.
Evolution of microcredit
Microcredit is a new form of lending to the poor, hailed as a social innovation of the
1970s, resulting in loans to about 200 million people (Maes and Reed 2012; Reed 2013)
and impacting about a billion people (taking a family size of five). Figure 1 illustratesTable 1 Microcredit institutions’ loan statistics
Regions Gross loan portfolio (US$) Average loan size (US$)
Africa 4.6 billion 371.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 22.9 billion 1,024.4
South Asia 8.4 billion 144.0
East Asia and Pacific 21.2 billion 305.6
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 8.3 billion 1,687.8
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Figure 1 Evolution of microfinance. Base on data from Microcredit Summit report (Maes and Reed 2012;
Reed 2013).
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today, 3,703 MFIs report to the Microcredit Summit Conference, indicating that they
have reached 195 million clients out of which 124 million are very poor.
Microcredit is staged today as a global movement and part of a globalization process, and
is considered as an excellent indicator of economic, social, and cultural opportunities, ‘an
important lever for change, contributing to local development …’ (Gentil and Servet 2002).
The number of customers has more than doubled from 2003 to 2011 (Table 2).
Table 3 provides the geographical distribution of microfinance.
Microcredit model
Microcredit consists generally of short-term loans with repayments that occur as soon
as the loan is disbursed. Repayment is either weekly or monthly.
The social innovation that microcredit was typically associated with was the use of an
innovative mechanism in the financial world in order to reduce default risk and to
avoid excluding candidates to credit: creating groups of borrowers for lending to the
poor, staggered lending, progressive lending, frequent repayments, local management,
compulsory savings, and training in the management of income-generating activities.
While these methodologies are often associated with the Nobel Peace Prize winning
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, similar models started at around the same time in Brazil
and Bolivia and even existed decades earlier in the informal sector, such as tontines or
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. Professor Muhammad Yunus, the founder of
Grameen Bank, was able to create a faster social diffusion of his particular, and this
helped him get, conjointly with his bank, the Nobel Prize. In this group lending model,
















31 December 2003 2,931 81 55 45 82.5
31 December 2009 3,589 190 128 105 81.7
31 December 2010 3,652 205 138 113 81.9
31 December 2011 3,703 195 124
Source: State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2004, 2011, and 2012 (Daley-Harris 2004, 2011; Maes and Reed
2012; Reed 2013).
Table 3 Number of active borrowers of microcredit
Number of microcredit institutions Actives borrowers (millions)
Regions
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,009 12.7
Asia and the Pacific 1,746 169.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 647 13.8
Middle East and North Africa 91 4.3
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 73 5.2
North America and Western Europe 86 0.2
Total 3,652 205.3
Source: State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2012 (Maes and Reed 2012).
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also get a loan. This simple mechanism coupled with some others overcame some of
the problems outlined above. The use of social information available to the groups
helps them seek similar kinds of members (safer ones) to overcome adverse selection.
Constant monitoring of each other as well as pressure to repay helps them overcome
moral hazard. The group would also provide help (advice, network) to each other so
that the other members succeed and others would get a loan. The group lending con-
sists also of granting credit to a group whose members are chosen freely and are jointly
or severally liable for the repayment of all the loans to the group. If one member fails,
the others are required to force her to honor the commitment, otherwise they will be
the ones who will pay back in her place. Reimbursements were also more likely if the
loans were collected frequently: weekly rather than quarterly. The joint liability of the
group enabled social collateral to fill the absence of physical collateral. To reduce trans-
action costs, repayments were made by all the groups of the village at the same time,
enabling the credit agent to come to a village, take the money, and then proceed to the
next village. Often, loans were made to women since they were considered safer to lend
to. An ancillary benefit has been the empowerment of women if this has led to them
participating in society. Lending is most of the time progressive and consists of provid-
ing credit in tranches whose amount increases as the reimbursement is effective. Future
loans are provided only if the previous period has been repaid.
Microcredit has been confronted with many problems and has responded by innovat-
ing: providing individual credit (once the group-based lending has permitted informa-
tion gathering), nonstandard sums, providing credit to men also, and many other
innovations. Moreover, since credit is only one financial service and produces stress,
new innovations included the development of microsavings, microinsurance, micro-
guarantees, microremittances, and micropayments. All of these have fueled the growth of
microfinance.
The rapid growth of the microfinance sector has been accompanied by high profit-
ability for a vast percentage of MFIs. Based on voluntarily submitted data from
Microfinance Information eXchange by over 1,000 MFIs, we find that the median re-
turn on equity (ROE) is 8%, and from Figure 2, we can see that a good three-fourths
(below the top curve) is profitable (ROE > 0), about half have a ROE greater than 10%
(between the top two curves), and about one-tenth of all MFIs manage to obtain a re-
turn on equity higher than 40% (below the bottom curve).
Figure 2 Return on equity of microfinance institutions. Based on MIX data downloaded on
June 12, 2012.
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charged to offset high operating costs. Using yield as a proxy for interest rate, according
to our data from the MIX, the median MFI charges 28% per annum, as shown in
Figure 3, about one-fourth charge more than 40% per year, and about a tenth of MFIs
charge more than 60% per year. A few outliers charge more than 80%, yielding to a lot
of public and academic debate on the ethics of MFIs (Ashta and Bush 2009; Rhyne and
Guimon 2007; Rosenberg 2007). At the same time, these interest rates are much lower
than those of moneylenders (Eversole 2003; Armendàriz and Morduch 2005).
It is believed that interest rates in microfinance will reduce only with a reduction in
operational costs owing either to competition-induced better governance (Rosenberg
et al. 2009) or due to the use of innovative technologies such as cloud computing infor-
mation systems, mobile banking, and online financing of microfinance institutions
(Ashta 2011). Together with these technological innovations, it is believed that institu-
tional innovations are required in public governance as well as corporate governance.
Despite this impressive growth, it is recognized that only 11% of African poor have
access to microcredit, and large tracts of Latin America are also not covered (Maes and
Reed 2012). According to Epstein and Yuthas (2010), it is possible that MFIs avoid
areas where they believe that there are either cultures of non-repayment or because the
poor lack the necessary entrepreneurial abilities. These cultures of non-repayment may
be owing to factors such as individualistic (as opposed to collectivist) characteristics,
attitudes towards the debt and the wealthy, and mistrust of institutions and priorFigure 3 Interest rate yield of microfinance institutions. Based on MIX data downloaded on
June 12, 2012.
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forgiveness. They suggest the use of smaller groups and strengthening ties between
members by encouraging them to help each other's business, thus building trust be-
tween the members, and a more personalized and closer interaction between the MFIs
and the borrowers with business and capacity building activities and transparency to
build trust with the MFI, thus distinguishing it from other institutions with whom the
borrower may have dealt in the past.
Microcredit and entrepreneurial opportunities
Microcredit is believed to finance survival enterprises rather than entrepreneurial en-
terprises which are larger and better capitalized (Epstein and Yuthas 2010). Develop-
ment actors want to show the potential of poor people to take entrepreneurial
initiatives. Through microcredit, they want to highlight the ability of the poor to cre-
ate their own business, doing their own jobs, if they are freed from the constraint of
self-financing their projects. Microcredit is for the masses excluded from the conven-
tional financial system, sometimes subject to the whims of suppliers and the depend-
ence on moneylenders, with a hope to enable them to develop a wide range of
productive activities, thus generating income, and in turn, improve their living condi-
tions and social status.
Microcredit is characterized by a strategy based primarily on a participatory
process. This process requires the active involvement of all actors in society, espe-
cially the borrowers, towards the objectives of fighting against poverty. Through this
approach, the poor will find the opportunity to influence policies that are supposed
to affect their lives. The philosophy of microcredit is that the beneficiaries should
not be passive actors in the fight against poverty (which makes them assisted), but
rather active actors, responsible for improving their living conditions. Undoubtedly,
it has the characteristics of participation and empowerment that are radically differ-
ent from assistantship.
However, the scope of microcredit is limited to the ability of beneficiaries to enhance
the resources that are available to them. Microcredit should not give the impression
that everyone is able to create, edit, manage, and develop her own business.
An evaluation of microcredit for entrepreneurship
An interesting framework for the evaluation of microcredit was provided by Zeller
and Meyer (2002) who argue that successful microfinance institutions have to bal-
ance the triangle of outreach, sustainability, and impact. Outreach is often divided
into breadth (number of poor people reached) and depth (vulnerability of poor
people reached). As we can see, the triangle is essentially consisting of problems in-
herent in any double bottom line or hybrid entity: how to balance the need for high
breadth of outreach and economic profitability with the need to reach the most vul-
nerable and have an impact in getting them out of poverty by helping them develop
their enterprises.
In recent years, microcredit has come under increasing attacks from virulent aca-
demics and media. These critiques can be grouped into two major categories: the first
one is mission drift and the second one is related to its lack of proven impact. We will
discuss both of these as they relate to entrepreneurship.
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The mission drift critiques are usually on diversion into consumer credit, larger loan
sizes, and high interest rates. Thus, according to them, microfinance starts to resemble
the existing conservative actors (banks, consumer finance, moneylenders) who perpetu-
ate poverty by redirecting microfinance from entrepreneurship which would solve the
poverty problem. The first critique of mission drift is essentially that microcredit is in-
creasingly being used for consumer credit rather than entrepreneurial finance. This is
not to say that consumer credit is bad: it may lead to positive outcomes such as con-
sumption smoothening, food consumption, economic self-sufficiency, and some aspects
of mental health and outlook, with some finding negative effects on other aspects of
mental health (depression and stress) (Karlan and Zinman 2010). And of course, the
dividing line between consumer finance and entrepreneurial finance is often blurred:
for example, how would you place education loans or loans for professional training?
An innovative method for combining education and microfinance is provided by
Tooley (2007) who suggests that private education-dispensing enterprises should be
formed (since public schools do not deliver) and financed by microloans.
A second critique is that even when it is being used for entrepreneurial finance, we
are using it for giving loans to the near poor rather than the poorest. For example,
Copestake et al. (2001) studied PULSE in Zambia and found that it targets clients who
are better off than the poor. This is usually reflected in larger loan sizes. Larger loan
sizes are usually applied for by those who are educated, males, those with access to
bank credit, and those having assets for collateral; and MFIs grant larger loans at higher
interest rates to those who have more assets, higher valued collaterals, minimal equity,
effective loans, and more experience (Dutta and Magableh 2006). Often, it is not pos-
sible to expect the ultra-poor to become entrepreneurs without first giving them sub-
sidies aimed at building their minimal capacity to enterprise (Tavanti 2013). The
critique needs to be nuanced in the wake of the Microcredit Summit data indicating
that 124 million of the 195 million microcredits are in fact going to the very poor. Another
part of this critique is that the institutions posing as MFIs are actually financing small
enterprises managed by not-at-all-poor entrepreneurs (Pisani and Yoskowitz 2004).
A third critique is that profitability motivation has led to a focus on high interest
rates which siphon off the profits from the microentrepreneur to the microfinance in-
stitution, creating a feeling of deceit among the borrowers (Eversole 2003). A wave of
critiques in the media and in academics took off with the successful IPO in 2007 of the
microfinance MFI Compartamos which was reported charging interest rates as high as
99% per year (including VAT) (Ashta and Bush 2009; Ashta and Hudon 2012; Lewis
2008; Smith and Epstein 2007). A second much publicized IPO that attracted critiques
was by SKS in 2010 in India which led to accusations that the microcredit is causing
borrower stress and even suicides (Ashta et al. 2011). This led to the collapse of
microfinance in Andhra Pradesh in India. The size of this state's microfinance is so im-
portant that it may largely explain the reduction in global microfinance from 205 mil-
lion clients to 195 million clients (Reed 2013).
The impact of microcredit
Studies on the impact of microcredit have shown mixed results. Some show positive im-
pact on enterprise, households as well as the community (Woller 2002; Pitt et al. 2006),
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tial positive impact on enterprise growth in terms of revenue and employment generation
from taking microcredit but stagnation in the number of employees thereafter, and those
women entrepreneurs taking microcredit gain more than male entrepreneurs in terms of
staying in the program as well as employment generation. Afrin et al. (2010) find that the
positive impacts on successful women entrepreneurs come from microfinance institutions
providing them complimentary human and human capital by teaching them financial skills
and providing them a group identity. The financial skills could also have been imparted to
the families of women if they were in business. Belwal et al. (2012) find that income and
savings of women entrepreneurs increased after taking microcredit, but they conclude that
this did not have any positive impact on their lives after loan repayment and interest. Stud-
ies on the lack of impact of microcredit focus usually on either statistical results or reasons
of overfocusing on microcredit to deliver anything.
The first group consist of experimental as well as qualitative studies indicating that
microcredit has no impact, no statistically significant positive impact, or that any impact
which is proven is not robust from one study to another or on one indicator across geog-
raphies. For example, one study indicates that those entrepreneurs who take a second loan
have usually gained in terms of profits, household income, and diversification, but those
who drop out after one loan have usually suffered (Copestake et al. 2001).
The second group of studies focuses on the impossibility of credit alone to alleviate
poverty. They usually focus either on the need for providing complementary capital to
financial capital or on financial services other than microcredit. For example, Gomez
and Santor (2001) show that the success of microfinanced enterprises is significantly
determined by social capital of the entrepreneur and the neighborhood environment.
Similarly, Burand (2012) would like to complement microcredit with ready-to-go
microfranchise packets of desirable goods that the poor can market in their villages
and communities through networks. Thus, we see the importance of social capital in
marketing the products financed by microcredit, as well as the human capital of the
people who designed the microfranchise packet.
Other microfinance products and entrepreneurship
To overcome the criticisms of microcredit, which could be viewed as conservative actors
taking over the work of social innovators and institutional entrepreneurs to suit their own
ends, it is evident that new avenues need to be explored. One response has been to indicate
that for microcredit to be useful, the poor need a range of other financial products. Social
entrepreneurs are therefore trying to provide these additional financial services. Evidently,
if ways of diffusing other financial products to the masses can be found through social
innovation, then conservative actors too could take over these innovations to suit their
own ends. These new financial products include guarantees, insurance, savings remittances,
and equity, as shown in Figure 4. In this part, we look at the relatively smaller literature on
these aspects to see if these financial products would foster entrepreneurship and, through
this, an end to poverty or whether it would merely impact consumption.
Microguarantees and entrepreneurship
Evidently, if microcredit is placing stress on microentrepreneurs, it is because MFIs do
not guarantee their returns and they themselves are under pressure. This is evident as












Managing stress through balance
Figure 4 A range of financial products for the microentrepreneur.
Ashta et al. Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship Page 11 of 232014, 3:4
http://www.innovation-entrepreneurship.com/content/3/1/4the business model moves from group credit, with its inherent social guarantees, to in-
dividual lending. Thus, individual guarantees would be the first solution to the new so-
cial problem of stress in the system.
In developed countries, mutual guarantee associations or government-backed pub-
lic institutions guarantee part of the banks' loans to entrepreneurs (De Gobbi 2003).
This reassures the bank because often entrepreneurs are able to pay back a large part
of the loan, even if they are not successful in total reimbursement. The European As-
sociation of Mutual Guarantee Societies has 34 members providing guarantees for
1.9 million small and medium enterprises (Source aecm.org 2009 statistics). This is
the case for example in France of the social cohesion fund, established by the Plan-
ning Act for Social Cohesion on 18 January 2005 (Lecomte 2008). The fund has over
5 years of 73 million euros. It brings guarantee for microenterprises created by disad-
vantaged populations or individuals who are victims of banking exclusion. However,
although such guaranteeing institutions are cropping up in developing countries,
they do not have the required outreach among the poor.
Guarantees are closely related to microcredit. Part of the reason microentrepreneurs,
especially poor ones, are not able to get loans is that they do not have collateral.
Microfinance has used social solidarity guarantees to overcome this problem: if one of
the borrowers cannot pay, someone else from the group would not get a loan or some-
one else from the group must pay (De Gobbi 2003).
Of course, microentrepreneurs can also get guarantees from people who do have col-
lateral. But very often, poor people lack the bridging social capital to meet richer people
who would be willing to put their assets at risk for helping out the poor. Today, thanks
to technology, we see the development of websites such as UnitedProsperity.org which
take cash from someone in a rich country which then serves as cash collateral for a
Ashta et al. Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship Page 12 of 232014, 3:4
http://www.innovation-entrepreneurship.com/content/3/1/4bank loan to a MFI and from the MFI to a poor entrepreneur, thus extending the ability
of the MFI to give loans to poor people.
Microinsurance and entrepreneurship
The difficulty in mobilizing guarantees from rich people in favor of microentrepreneurs
led to a search for insurance to cover the risk of default. As it became evident that
business default came not only from business risk but also from personal risks of the
microentrepreneur not being able to work, for example for health reasons, personal
microinsurance was also desired. Insurance for the poor as mutual protection was the
foundation of many insurance countries in the nineteenth century (Churchill 2007).
The importance of microinsurance emanates from the limitations of conventional loan-
based microcredit programs in protecting the poor from all sorts of vulnerabilities. Al-
though microcredit has been shown to generate various beneficial outcomes, there is
also evidence that not all sectors of the poor can benefit. One such group is those who
experience severe health shocks, which reduce work capacity and investment and re-
quire a redirection of resources to the consumption of healthcare (Hamid et al. 2011).
Due to increased evidence that microcredit does not help the poorest of the poor, wel-
farists stress the value of adding auxiliary services to improve the effectiveness of the
programs (Hamid et al. 2011; Bhatt and Tang 2001; Woller et al. 1999; Woller and
Woodworth 2001). Insurance can protect vulnerable people from risks and shocks
when existing coping strategies fail.
The first noted search for microinsurance is a paper by Dror and Jacquier (1999). A
notable publication is an edited publication by Churchill (2006).
Microinsurance is a program which provides insurance services to low-income popula-
tions and small businesses in developing countries. It is typically characterized as a finan-
cial arrangement to protect low-income people against specific perils in exchange for
regular premium payments proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk involved
(Biener and Eling 2011; Churchill 2007). As this definition implies, microinsurance serves
the low-income population based on the same fundamentals as regular insurance (Biener
and Eling 2011). A wide range of risks is covered, and products comparable to those in
regular insurance markets are provided. Common types of risks covered are life, health,
disability, and property (especially agricultural insurance). The particularity is that
microinsurance is characterized by low premiums and low caps.
Most MFIs admit that many clients use loans to pay for medical expenses, funerals,
or to smooth household cash flow. Even if they do not have an immediate emergency,
some customers only invest a portion of the loan in their businesses and save the rest
so that they will have a cushion to fall back on if they experience repayment problems
(Churchill 2002). These assertions support the argument that in the absence of signifi-
cant assets and other risk mitigation mechanisms, the poor lack the capacity to with-
stand the consequences of many shocks (Cohen et al. 2005). A study in Tanzania,
Uganda, and Kenya shows that for the poor, the impact of a shock follows a two-step
process: the immediate impact of the loss of assets and/or income and need of money,
and the impact in the medium and long term that requires strategic choices coming
from households, particularly in terms of resource reallocation (Barlet 2000). Thus, a
shock that would prove mild to upper- and middle-income households can, in the case
of a poor household, dramatically reduce assets (including stocks of physical and
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ultimately put present and future generations of the poor deeper into poverty. The vul-
nerability is directly related to the ability of households to manage risk (Barlet 2000).
To cope with shocks, poor households use many different risk management strategies,
including informal group-based and self-insurance mechanisms, such as borrowing,
saving, and drawing down productive and nonproductive assets. A relatively new option
for the working poor to manage risk is microinsurance. Indeed, for a low-income per-
son, usually the beneficiaries of microcredit for the implementation of microprojects,
microinsurance paves the way for better risk management and helps reduce vulnerabil-
ities to shocks.
The poor are more vulnerable to risks than the rest of the population (Churchill
2007), and they are the least able to cope in case of occurrence of the crisis. Further-
more, poverty and vulnerability reinforce each other in an escalating downward spiral.
The occurrence of a crisis puts particularly financial pressure on low-income persons
who, moreover, suffer from the uncertainty about whether and when a loss might
occur. Because of the precarious world of the poor, a shock such as illness, death of a
loved one, fire, or theft can rapidly erase hard-won gains and make the escape from
poverty harder to achieve (Cohen and Sebstad 2005). Based on this apprehension, the
poor are less likely to take advantage of income-generating opportunities that might re-
duce poverty (Churchill 2007). The link between vulnerability and entrepreneurship is
no longer subject to doubt. A shock plunges a person or a low-income household in a
state of inactivity and therefore in poverty by the loss of labor force or by massive ab-
sorption of household resources.
Microinsurance may be either directly related to entrepreneurship or indirectly re-
lated. Examples of direct relationship with entrepreneurship include property risks such
as crop insurance, cattle/livestock insurance, theft/fire insurance, and insurance for nat-
ural disasters. The reasoning is that when a farmer has insurance against downside risk,
he is inclined to be more risk seeking which can pull him out of poverty. For example,
if he is insured against crop failure, he can use innovative cropping strategies which
may have higher yields.
Examples of indirect relationship with entrepreneurship include health and accident
insurance (illness, injury, disabilities). Often, if a poor entrepreneur falls ill, he is unable
to work and repay loans. As a result, his business collapses. If health insurance kicks in,
he is able to survive during this critical period and continue repaying his loans. Re-
search suggests that households that are insured against hospitalization and accidental
death have less diversified income portfolios (Kwon 2010). This focus on a core busi-
ness may improve profits.
No centralized agency maintains public-access documents for microinsurance. A sur-
vey in Africa (Matul et al. 2009) estimated that there were 14.7 million poor people in-
sured in Africa, 56% of which is in South Africa. The most used insurance product was
credit life insurance, i.e., an insurance which repays the debt if the insured dies.
Microinsurance may be delivered directly by insurance companies but is often packaged
in ways by which it can be delivered by microfinance institutions, which are directly in
contact with microborrowers. Some microinsurance programs are community-based mu-
tualization of risk but suffer from low coverage. Two preconditions for commercial
microinsurance firms to successfully sell directly to the poor is to understand how the
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ance (Churchill 2007).
A study of 600 MFIs indicated that MFIs' willingness to offer microinsurance is posi-
tively correlated to a rise in the financial expense ratio, loan repayments in arrears, years
of operation, number of borrowers, woman borrower ratio, life insurance penetration ra-
tio, and family size. In contrast, the willingness to offer microinsurance is negatively corre-
lated with their loan asset ratio, bad loan write-off ratio or average loan size in comparison
to GNI per capita (Kwon 2010).
In conclusion, improved health status may lead to higher productivity, higher labor
supply, fewer workdays lost, and reduced healthcare expenditure (Hamid et al. 2011).
In addition, if households are insured against health risk, they may invest in high-
return riskier assets because they do not need to retain cash or to hold highly liquid as-
sets for precautionary purposes. Microinsurance is therefore an innovation for fostering
entrepreneurship.
Microsavings and entrepreneurship
One problem with insurance is that the microentrepreneur has to pay premiums, which
he may not be able to afford, especially if the risk is shared only by local entrepreneurs. A
cheaper alternative would be for the entrepreneurs to save money and use it when re-
quired. Savings can be useful for transactional reasons (consumption smoothening),
precautionary reasons (risk mitigation) as well as speculative reasons (windfalls/opportun-
ities). ‘Saving is where financial services begin and end’ (Rutherford 2001). Microsavings
are the small amounts of money saved by poor people with financial institutions, mostly
MFIs. They provide a source of lump sum cash in case of future events, i.e., emergencies,
start-up business capital, and major life cycle events, and they support daily consumption
needs of the poor people (Mersland and Eggen 2007).
MFIs have the development objective of employment creation to facilitate growth of en-
terprises along with poverty reduction. As financial service providers, MFIs on one hand
provide loans to accelerate growth of existing enterprises and facilitate creation of new en-
terprises while, on the other hand, gives the entrepreneurs access to secure places for sav-
ings. With majority of the MFI clients being women, researchers inferred that credit and
saving services have contributed partially towards incomes and savings of women entrepre-
neurs (Belwal et al. 2012). Among the poorest of the poor, the most important element of
microfinance is not lending but providing savings opportunities (Collins et al. 2010). Such
savings can be quite useful in the lives of the poor people as once a large amount is accu-
mulated together, this can finance acquisition of assets, construction of houses, and more
importantly, starting up community-based enterprises.
Rutherford (1999) describes three basic ways people can covert a flow of savings into a
lump sum: ‘saving up,’ ‘saving down,’ and ‘saving through’. Saving up is mentioned as the
small accumulation of money until it reaches a lump sum; saving down refers to loans,
where people save in the form of making the repayments of the loans; and saving through is
either through insurance or some other group-based system where the poor people may get
access to a lump sum at the time it is needed through a series of small savings. All three sys-
tems are important to promote entrepreneurial activities as financing the entrepreneurship
needs of poor clients is on top of the list of financial service-providing MFIs, and this
smoothens the client's income, thus helping build a sustainable livelihood (Tavanti 2010).
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use credit. The Opportunity International Bank of Malawi has 45,000 borrowers and
250,000 savers, the Equity Bank in Kenya has 715,000 borrowers and four million de-
positors, and the Grameen Bank has over US$1.4 billion in deposits, which is 145% of
its outstanding loan portfolio of US$965 million (Maes and Reed 2012). In a study in
Bangladesh, it is found that there are 27.8 million depositors and about 20.6 million
borrowers in a sample of 28 MFIs and that 26 of these 28 Bangladeshi MFIs have more
depositors than borrowers (Khan and Ashta 2012). Another study has shown that only
24.5% of the services of the microfinance institutions go towards the extremely poor
(Rahman 1998). Extremely poor people generally tend to exclude themselves from trad-
itional microcredit programs, either through self-exclusion or through a process of peer
screening. Self-exclusion refers to the poor people's fear of not being able to repay the
loans due to different social and/or religious barriers; thus, they are not willing to bor-
row (Hashemi 1997). Many of the poor people are also excluded by the peer members
of the traditional group methodology, where they are regarded as risky and unreliable
as social collateral (Hulme and Mosley 1997). While the poor people do have their own
ways of coping with vulnerability, they do so by accessing savings schemes and emer-
gency loans to enable themselves to cover short-term crises (Hasan and Iglebaek 2004).
In this process, they develop a social relationship with the microfinance institutions,
where they demand to be served individually through carefully designed savings prod-
ucts. SafeSave in Bangladesh has demonstrated such relationship with its clients
through the introduction of a daily collection system and service delivery at the door-
step of the clients. The basic philosophy of SafeSave's financial service to its clients is
to give them the opportunity to save, without any mandatory requirement to borrow,
unlike the traditional Grameen approach, where progressive borrowing is a precondi-
tion to access such service.
However, there are many informal sector microsavings institutions on which very lit-
tle data is available. For example in Ethiopia, there are community-based organizations
such as Ekub, a system of forced saving, with finance secured through traders, friends,
and relatives; and Iddir, informal associations where members save for funeral costs
(Belwal et al. 2012). Similarly, there are susu schemes in West Africa (Adusei and
Appiah 2012). In addition, there are microfinance institutions which may require com-
pulsory deposits as a prerequisite to providing loans.
Adusei and Appiah (2012) studied the impact of the susu scheme on entrepreneurs.
Essentially, these schemes collect a small amount of savings on a daily or weekly basis
and return the money at the end of the month after taking a fee. During the period, the
collected sum can also be lent out with interest, but no interest is paid on the deposits.
These savings then help the entrepreneur discharge his end-of-the month working cap-
ital responsibilities. Ninety-six percent of the depositors find that the susu system helps
them in their business. The perceived impact of this system of microsavings on busi-
ness is more for married entrepreneurs as well as for male entrepreneurs, suggesting
that women use their money for their families. Moreover, the impact on business is
higher the longer the people stay in the system and the more they deposit.
Entrepreneurship can generate a much stronger concentration of wealth (Quadrini
2009). In many developing countries, among many economically active poor people,
technical knowledge and skills are limited, as are money management skills and access
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wealth. From this, the incentive of entrepreneurs to accumulate wealth to overcome
the borrowing constraints is derived (Quadrini 2009). The propensity to save and to
form solidarity groups to facilitate access to microsavings, which also gives security of
the small amount of money the entrepreneurial poor accumulate over time, and com-
bined with money management skill delivery, access to small amounts of capital for in-
vestment, links to financial institutions, business skills training, and various life skill
enhancements resulted in the rapid growth of small-scale enterprises both at rural and
urban settings. Again, enterprising households can have significant concentration of
wealth, which could result from the high savings rates of the entrepreneurs (Quadrini
1999). Gentry and Hubbard (2004) quantified that entrepreneurial households own a
substantial share of household wealth and income, and this share increases throughout
the wealth distribution and the income distribution.
At all stage of business development, capital pumped in by the entrepreneur plays a
key role (Chamlee-Wright 2002). The main source of finance for microentrepreneurs is
personal savings (Gunu 2010). Small traders largely depend on their own savings to
provide for the start-up capital, and at a later stage, they try to access alternative
sources of fund to expand the business. MFIs, ROSCAs, Accumulated Savings and
Credit Associations (ASCAs), and many other informal mechanisms are present glo-
bally to facilitate such access to varying financial services. Another key area of funding
is remittances from migrant workers accumulated as savings. This accumulated savings
and the technical skills the returning migrants gather during their stay abroad may pro-
vide the basis for entrepreneurial activities, which contribute to the economic develop-
ment of their country of origin (Lianos and Pseiridis 2009). After the Vietnam War,
Asian immigrants have successfully established numerous small business enterprises in
US communities with the help of having access to capital through informal financial
market (ROSCAs) and business counseling services (Chotigeat et al. 1991).
Although microsavings can be developed by banks, in many countries (for example,
India), social innovator actors in the form of NGOs are not allowed to collect savings
as this was reserved for banks. Now, in the wake of the Andhra Pradesh crisis, it is rec-
ognized that microfinance institutions need savings, and very small savings are being
allowed by the central bank in the name of encouraging thrift. Thus, public policy is
being used to permit social actors to get local finance to provide credit.
Microremittances and entrepreneurship
If the microentrepreneur has difficulty saving his own money, his next step for funding
would be to turn towards love money from friends and family. This transfer or remit-
tances often comes from relatives who have migrated. Human beings have migrated
since the beginning of civilization. People migrate for food and security, searching bet-
ter employment opportunities and income security. Today, migration does not take
place only to change the destiny of migrating people but also to improve the livelihood
conditions of families staying back in their home countries. This is done through remit-
tances, which channel the migrants' income. Even when the migrants return to their
home country, they bring in with them the benefits related to the skills acquired abroad
and to the savings brought home by returnees with the purpose of undertaking entre-
preneurial activities (Lianos and Pseiridis 2009). In 2005, the worldwide officially
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$167 billion, which was more than twice the level of development aid from all sources
(World Bank 2006).
Remittance is the surplus portion of earnings sent back by the expatriate community
from the country of employment to the home country. Over the years, remittance has
emerged as an important source of external development finance (Hasan 2006). Remit-
tance has significant impact at the household level. This impact of remittances partially
depends on the characteristics of the migrants and the recipients, i.e., whether they
constitute the rural poor or the more educated sectors of the population generally res-
iding in urban areas (Hasan 2006).
The remittances from migrants are an important source of funding for the economies
of developing countries and recipient populations. There are broad segments of society
who would live in extreme poverty without these resources. It is considered that these
transfers have a significant impact on poverty reduction, funding for housing, educa-
tion, other basic needs, and even on investment and entrepreneurship. Woodruff and
Zenteno (in Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006)) estimate that 27% of microenterprises
located in urban areas in Mexico rely on remittances from abroad.
In 2005, the worldwide officially recorded remittances were US$232 billion. Of this, de-
veloping countries received US$167 billion, which was more than twice the level of devel-
opment aid from all sources (World Bank 2006). Total remittances have increased
steadily and were US$440 billion worldwide, and of this, US$325 billion went to develop-
ing countries in 2010.
Even in a situation of economic and financial crisis in the migrants' country of resi-
dence, monetary flows tend to remain stable, unlike economic development assistance
and investment. Remittances from migrants to their families in sub-Saharan Africa were
US$ 21.5 billion in 2010, despite a slight decline in 2009 due to the global financial crisis,
according to the Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 (Collection Statistics 2011
World Bank on migration and remittances). Of this, Nigeria received as much as US$10
billion, followed by Sudan (US$3.2 billion), Kenya (US$1.8 billion), Senegal (US$1.2 billion),
South Africa (US$1 billion), Uganda (US$800 million), Lesotho (US$500 million), Ethiopia
(US$387 million), Mali (US$385 million), and Togo (US$385 million). In terms of percent-
age of gross domestic product, the largest recipients in 2009 were Lesotho (25% of GDP),
Togo (10.3%), Cape Verde (9.1%), Guinea-Bissau (9.1%), Senegal (9.1%), Gambia (7.9%),
Liberia (6.2%), Sudan (5.6%), Nigeria (5.6%), and Kenya (5.4%).
It should be emphasized that the figures on which to base these reports do not include
informal channels used by millions of migrants. These figures are therefore below the ac-
tual amounts. It is therefore essential to facilitate remittances and lower the transaction
costs. It is estimated that sending funds to Africa costs on average 10% of the amount sent.
Remittances are cited as making up around 60% to 70% of recipient poor households'
total income (De Bruyn and Kuddus 2005). Investment in health and education is valuable
for long-term economic growth and poverty reduction. Studies have found that migrant
families invested more in these areas (Murshid et al. 2002). While such investment works
as an indirect contributor towards developing entrepreneurial skill, remittance acts as an
enabler to develop human capital as well as direct investment in enterprise. Inflow of re-
mittances is directly associated with a larger volume of own finance, which in turn affects
the total financial size of the start-up project as well (Korosteleva and Mickiewicz 2011).
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consumption goods, which otherwise would not have been possible due the nature of
large cash involvement in such initiatives (Yang 2008). Yang (2008) also identified that
when developed countries facilitate employment opportunities for workers from overseas,
this contributes in stimulating human capital investment and entrepreneurship at the
household levels of developing countries.
Some key elements to promote entrepreneurship could be diverse source of capital,
enabling environment, policy framework, and supportive infrastructure (Pages and
Markley 2004). Running a profitable business also depends largely on the skill, capacity,
knowledge, and training of the entrepreneur. Application of such knowledge and skill,
often, could be facilitated through accumulation of large sum of money coming in the
form of foreign remittance. While much of the incoming remittances are used by re-
cipient household for consumption, any residual after consumption may be converted
into savings to be used not only for future consumption but also for investment pur-
poses (Rivera and Reyes 2011).
Microequity and entrepreneurship
Obviously a missing ingredient to microcredit, to provide relief to the over-indebted
borrower, is equity. Therefore, we should immediately see the need for supplementing
the equity of the borrower through founder's equity from savings, love money from re-
mittances, and angel investors. However, very poor people have very little savings and
their social network is often too poor to provide them with love money. It is evident
that they need to go to business angels, but business angels are rarely interested in pro-
jects which are as tiny as a few hundred dollars or even a few thousand dollars.
There is therefore a need for microangels. This would be a new breed of investors
who would provide small amounts of capital for different motivations. Some may want
profit; some may want to do good to help poor people survive. We comment briefly on
four such movements: the local investment movement in France (CIGALES), slow
money, socially responsible investment and impact investment, and crowdfunding.
In France, since 1983, there are investment clubs such as CIGALES (Nouvel 2004;
Taupin and Glemain 2006; Russo 2007) which regroup investors who want to make alter-
native use of their solidarity savings in local projects. At the end of 2012, the movement
has grown to 220 clubs with almost 3,000 members (an average of 13 members per club).
Thus, again we see the use of groups as a social innovation, made possible through the pos-
sibility of using a legal form (indivision) which is specific to France. The average contri-
bution of each member is 25 euros a month or 300 euros a year. For 13 members, this makes
a pooled investment possibility of 3,900 euros. This money is then invested in a microen-
terprise. While 95% of business angels are male, it is found that more than a third of these
microangels are women, 72% have a university degree, and 72% are actively employed
(Estapé-Dubreuil et al. 2012). The select projects are based on social and solidarity aspects,
economic aspects, as well as environmental aspects. However, the ranking of these factors
may vary from region to region: for example, in Brittany there are many investment clubs
financing windmills. The selection criteria for the investments also take into account entre-
preneurial characteristics, of which the three most important are entrepreneur's motiv-
ation, level of understanding shown by the team presenting the project, and social and
solidarity motivations (Estapé-Dubreuil et al. 2012). The movement grows especially in
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institutional, and communication difficulties have kept the movement from growing fur-
ther (Ashta and Hudon 2012).
One way of overcoming the high costs of diffusion of information is to use the inter-
net. The slow money movement in the USA is regrouping investment funds which
want to invest in local projects, often linked to slow food and artisans (Tasch 2009).
These investments are usually patient, agricultural-related, local, and small. Thus, the
objective enshrined in the CIGALES movement is being diffused today in the USA
(Ashta and Bratu 2013). However, the investment funds are much larger and investing
in socially and environmentally desirable projects of a larger size (Ashta 2013a). This
would then be using a technological innovation (the internet) and transposing a social
movement (slow food) to create a parallel innovation.
In fact, the funds registered on the slow money movement resemble largely the funds in
impact investment which could be considered as related to socially responsible invest-
ments. Recognizing that there are a lot of investors who want to get an impact bang out of
their investment buck, a whole new asset class of impact investments is being made to en-
courage investments in entrepreneurial projects which would lead to high impact all over
the world (Freireich and Fulton 2009). Examples include Aavishkaar, Acumen Fund, and
Root Capital. As opposed to socially responsible investments which seek near-market
returns but filter out undesirable sectors, impact investors tend to be social investors seek-
ing to get their money back with a low return to cover inflation. However, most of these
impact investments are too large to finance small entrepreneurs directly and are financing
instead the microfinance institutions. They are therefore close to dedicated microfinance
investment vehicles, such as ResponsAbility funds or Blue Orchard which also finance
microfinance institutions. Thus, innovation is more one of targeting people with noneco-
nomic motivations to invest in socially desirable sectors.
Can technology go further than mere diffusion of information and break this barrier
and allow for wider investment possibilities directly into microentrepreneur projects?
Crowdfunding websites are emerging to allow small investors to participate in financing
microentrepreneurial projects. Today, there are over 300 such websites with a new one
being started every other day. There are 24 such websites in France alone according to

















Figure 5 Dialectics in the social innovation process.
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France) or lend (Kiva in the USA and Babyloan in France), some are offering possibilities
to offer equity (WISEED in France). The legality of such equity offerings is not clear, but
ingenious means are being taken to circumvent laws which do not allow a small entrepre-
neur to ask the public for equity funds without the permission of the regulatory watchdog,
which wants to protect the small depositors. Clearly this is a radical innovation, specifi-
cally one of creating an ecosystem.
Conclusions
Microfinance has come out with a number of financial products to satisfy an unserved
market through innovative distribution. The market was unserved because the size of
the products was too large, entailing high costs and high risks for financial institutions.
By reducing the size of the product and by distributing it through new channels,
microfinance has effectively created an innovation. Moreover, microfinance has shown
the entrepreneurial potential of the poor and their ability to create their own jobs. It is
therefore an innovation that fosters entrepreneurship which allows recipients to de-
velop a wide range of productive activities that generate revenues.
Microfinance is evolving both as a social institution as well as in utilizing new tech-
nologies such as cloud computing information systems, mobile banking, and online finan-
cing of microfinance institutions for the development of its outreach (Ashta et al. 2011).
Many of the financial services being targeted to the poor, including microsavings, micro-
insurance, remittances, and government-to-poor payments, are based on innovative insti-
tutional creation. All of these represent areas for future research.
Our paper has presented an application to illustrate the dialectics in the social innovation
process as presented in Figure 5. The entrepreneur lacked financing since the banker did not
trust him. This social problem was solved by social innovations presented in microcredit. These
social innovations were blocked by conservative forces at a local level. To influence public policy,
the social entrepreneur therefore needs to attract public policy support, including donors and
regulators. Once social innovation is proved successful, banks and other for-profits can take over
the microcredit movement. However, their use of this leads to new forms of stress for the
microenterpreneur. This in turn requires new social innovations to provide services such as
microguarantees,microinsurance,microsavings,microremittances, andmicroequity.
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